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IDAHO STATUTES 
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The PlaintiffIAppellanffCross Respondent has included in its Reply Brief herein, 
a response to the Cross Appeal by the City of Preston on the issue of the denial of an 
award of attorneys fees raised by the City of Preston. The response is incorporated 
into this Reply Brief. 
STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
1. The RespondenffCross-Appellant, City of Preston, (hereafter "City") 
asserts in its Brief (Statement of Facts pp.2-3) the Fire Marshall for the Franklin County 
Fire District would not approve the connection to the subdivision being proposed by 
Scott Beckstead (hereafter "Beckstead") because the pipeline would not provide 
adequate fire flow to the subdivision. The apparent purpose for this assertion is to 
claim it was not the City's demand that Beckstead construct a new City mainline, but 
was a requirement of another governmental entity. The City relies on the Affidavit of its 
own engineer, Daryl Wilburn, for this statement, yet, this assertion was directly at odds 
with Mr. Wilburn's own letter written to the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality, 
on April 8, 2003, before the final plat of the Creamery Hollow Estates Subdivision had 
been approved and before any new pipeline had been installed. The letter states in 
part, 
This location has passed fire flow tests, by the Fire Marshall. This 
project has been included in the computerized hydraulic analysis, 
which indicates that fire flow will be adequate during the peak day. 
(See Affidavit of Scott Beckstead, R. Vol 1, pp. 102, 109) 
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2. Beckstead installed approximately 1,700 feet of twelve-inch pipe in 
October of 2003. The installation of the pipeline was required by the City in order to 
improve the City's water system and would benefit all persons on the City water system 
since it would enhance the City's ability to "loop" its pipeline system. In particular, it 
would benefit those persons who wished to connect to the new pipeline system along 
800 East, at a location approximately one-quarter mile from Beckstead's subdivision. 
The "looping" of the culinary mainline would enhance water pressure throughout the 
City, not just the Beckstead's subdivision. (R. Vol. 1 "Beckstead Aff.", P. 103) 
3. The City states in its Brief (pp.13-14), "Without replacing the four-inch line 
with a six-inch line, Beckstead's subdivision could not be approved. He chose to 
replace the four-inch line in order to obtain adequate fire flow for his subdivision". 
(City's Brief, p. 3) Beckstead did not replace the four-inch line referred to in the Brief. 
The twelve-inch pipe he installed connected a gap in the City's water system that was 
part of the "loop" which the City wished to close. The four-inch line referred to by the 
City in its Brief has not been replaced. (R.Vol.1, "Affidavit of Scott Beckstead", pp.102- 
103). 
4. The City pretends to have been in the dark about the costs of the pipeline 
following its installation, however, in order to apportion repayment for over-sizing the 
pipe, from 6 inches to 12 inches, the City had all of the information for the cost of the 
pipe by at least November 12, 2003. (See Exhibit to Beckstead's Third Affidavit 
showing a signed document by Beckstead, Daryl Wilburn, the City Engineer and Scott 
Martin, R. Vol. 2, P.273) 
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5. At no time did the City indicate to Beckstead he had to pay directly to the 
City the costs of installing the pipeline. This was never made a requirement by the City 
(Affidavit of Scott Beckstead, R. Vol 1, pp. 101-106). At no time did the City require 
competitive bids for the installation of the pipeline. The City's own engineer was directly 
involved in the project, as evidenced by the three affidavits he submitted, detailing the 
fact he was aware of all stages of this project from beginning to end, including the first 
fire flow test done to determine there was adequate water pressure for the subdivision 
prior to even the purchase of the property by Beckstead. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 201, 233, and 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE CITY CLAIMS ORDINANCE NO. 16.28.0308 DOES NOT APPLY TO THE 
OFF-SITE IMPROVEMENTS MADE BY BECKSTEAD TO THE CITY'S 
CULINARY MAINLINE SYSTEM. 
The City does not refer in its argument to the most important point of statutory 
construction which is whether the intent of the City's own reimbursement ordinance was 
meant to apply to the "off-site" improvements it required of Beckstead. Why? Because 
the clear intent of the Ordinance was to provide reimbursement to a person who has 
constructed "off-site" improvements to the City's infrastructure for exactly this type of 
pipeline project. The first step in any review of an ordinance or statute is to determine 
the intent of that ordinance or statute using the plain meaning of its words. If there is 
ambiguity, (as found by the District Court in its decision, R. Vol. 2, P. 276) the Court 
looks to principles of statutory construction, but always within the focused goal of 
carrying out the intent of the ordinance. Although there may be ambiguity in the 
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procedures used to carry out the intent of the Ordinance, the main purpose of the 
Ordinance is without doubt. Subdividers who have installed off-site improvements such 
as water lines and sewer lines shall be reimbursed their costs over a period of five 
years from the fees generated from those who subsequently connect to the water line 
or sewer line constructed by the subdivider. The steps of statutory construction are 
given in Messenger v. Burns, 86 ldaho 26, 29-30, 382 P.2d 913, 915 (1963): 
In construing a statute, it is the duty of this Court to ascertain the 
legislative intent, and give effect thereto. In ascertaining this intent, 
not only must the literal wording of the statute be examined, but also 
account must be taken of other matters 'such as the context, the 
object in  view, the evils to be remedied, the history of  the times and 
of the legislation upon the same subject, public policy, 
contemporaneous construction and the like.' In re Gem State 
Academy Bakery, 70 ldaho 531441,224 P.2d 529,535. Generally 
effect must be given, i f  possible, to every word, clause and sentence 
of the statute. State v. Alkire, 79 ldaho 334,317 P.2d 341. 
The City, in its Brief at page 12, sets forth eight steps which it states are 
necessary for the Ordinance to apply. First, the City states a subdivider must "notify the 
City that he wishes to invoke the Ordinance". Nowhere in the Ordinance is there a 
requirement that a subdivider give notice, written or otherwise, to the City to make the 
Ordinance effective. (R. Vol. 1, "Aff. of Beckstead pp. 101-104) The City should be 
aware of its own ordinances and should not need a "notice" that one of its own laws is 
in effect and operative. Obviously, the City was aware of the parameters and scope of 
this project since it was directly involved in it from the very beginning. The City also 
ignores the first words of the Ordinance which are all inclusive. The Ordinance states in 
its first phrase, "Whenever any intervening property (off-site) is benefitted by the 
installation of any of the required facilities,...". The use of the word "whenever any" 
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does not allow for the City to escape from its responsibility by claiming it has to have 
some type of "notice" from the subdivider before the Ordinance could be invoked. 
Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 on page 12 of the City's Brief, all refer to paying the costs 
of such facilities to the City after competitive bidding and obtaining verified engineering 
costs. The City ignores the qualifying modifier in the Ordinance which states such 
actions "may" be required. The use of the word "may" makes these items discretionary, 
not mandatory. In State v. Bunting Tractor Company, 58 Idaho 617, 623-625, 77 P.2d 
464, 465-467 (1938), the Supreme Court had occasion to construe the use of the word 
"may" in the context of a statute which stated that a state purchasing agent "may" be 
required to advertise and obtain competitive bids for the awarding of contracts and the 
purchase of supplies and equipment. The Court interpreted the use of the word "may" 
when "...appearing in legislation as having the meaning or expressing the right to 
exercise discretion; a permissive right, rather than the imperative or mandatory 
meaning of "must". The Court then held that advertising and competitive bidding was 
not required due to the use of the word "may" in the statute. This is directly applicable 
to the Beckstead claim where the use of the word "may" in the City Ordinance made 
discretionary paying costs directly to the city, competitive bidding and engineering 
costs. 
In this case, the City did not at any time require Beckstead to pay costs to the 
City, nor were competitive bids required and the City did not require an engineer, other 
than its own City engineer, to be involved in the pipeline project. (R. Vol. 2 "Beckstead 
Aff., pp. 262-263). 
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In its Brief at page 12, City requirement No. 5 states, "The engineer determines 
which intervening properties will be benefitted and the pro-rata share of the cost of each 
intervening property. This language is not found in the Ordinance. Further, it does not 
take an engineer to determine who the "intervening properties" will be since the 
Ordinance is clear these are the property owners who connect to the pipeline installed 
by the subdivider. 
Requirement No. 6 seems to imply there must be some sort of written agreement 
between the City and the subdivider containing multiple terms, including a pro-rata 
sharing of what each intervening property owner will pay if connected, etc. (City's Brief, 
P. 12) This is not found in the Ordinance. The only terms of an "agreement", if such is 
implied, are contained in the Ordinance and mandate the City's compliance. It states, 
"Such fees then be returned to the subdivider to reimburse the costs of the 
installation of the facilities; such agreement for reimbursement shall extend for a 
maximum period of five years from initial date of agreement after which time no further 
reimbursement shall be made to the subdivider". (emphasis added) (R.Vol. 1, P. 117) 
Once the pipeline was installed, the five-year period began to run for reimbursement 
purposes. There should be no necessity for the parties to agree as to what was already 
in the Ordinance. The City has put its own gloss on the wording of the Ordinance to 
somehow require a type of formal contract. This implies the City could mandate the 
installation of off-site improvements but refuse to sign some type of "agreement" for 
reimbursement thereby avoiding its responsibility under the Ordinance. 
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Paragraph 7 at page 12 in the City's Brief, indicates, "The bid is awarded and 
construction is completed". Again, the bidding requirement was permissive and not 
mandatory. The City wanted its pipeline system to be interconnected or looped in order 
to provide a greater benefit to the entire City and not once did the City indicate to 
Beckstead he was to have the project competitively bid, nor did the City require 
competitive bidding or advertising for the costs of over-sizing of the pipe. If competitive 
bidding was to be required by the City, why was this not done? (R. Vol. 1, "Beckstead 
Aff.", P. 103; R. Vol. 2, "Wilburn Aff.", P. 202) 
Requirement No. 8 states the City could somehow impose a surcharge or 
additional fee to intervening property owners over and above that charged to other 
persons seeking a water connection within the City. The Ordinance itself indicates the 
benefitted intervening property owners will be charged the fee rates for "sewer and 
water connections in effect at the time such connections are made". (R. Vol. 1, P. 117) 
No right to surcharge the intervening property owners is given. 
Noticeably absent from the list of eight requirements set forth in the City's Brief 
are the truly mandatory requirements placed upon the City to reimburse the subdivider 
for the costs of "off-site" improvements which are made obligatory by the use of the 
word "shall" in several material sections of the Ordinance. The City states the process 
is simple, but no such list of "simple" requirements was ever given to Beckstead at the 
time he began this project with the City. The interpretive gloss placed on the Ordinance 
by the City demonstrates the difficulties encountered when straying from the intent and 
plain wording of the Ordinance itself. The City takes no responsibility for complying with 
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the reimbursement part of the Ordinance despite the use of the word "shall" in the 
second sentence of the Ordinance making reimbursement mandatory upon the City. 
Neither the City nor the District Court reference any cases to refute those 
presented to the Court in Beckstead's Appellate Brief regarding statutory construction. 
Instead, they would rather follow a tangled path of procedural ambiguity than the clear 
intent of the Ordinance. 
11. THE CITY HAS RECEIVED A BENEFIT WHICH WOULD BE INEQUITABLE TO 
RETAIN WITHOUT COMPENSATING BECKSTEAD UNDER THE THEORY OF 
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
Although the theory of unjust enrichment was raised by Beckstead in his Motion 
for Summary Judgment, the District Court did not address this claim. In the absence of 
an opinion by the lower court, the Appellant Court is urged to take a completely "fresh" 
look at this issue. 
The City argues the installation of approximately 1700 feet of mainline pipe to its 
culinary system, for which it did not have to pay, is not of benefit to the City. Further, it 
argues that receiving the connection fees from intervening property owners who have 
connected to that same pipeline does not amount to a windfall despite the fact the City 
did not pay for the pipeline. 
Prior to purchasing the property which ultimately became the Creamery Hollow 
Estates Subdivision, Beckstead contacted the City and asked if the water pressure 
necessary to meet fire flow standards existed at the poi'nt where the subdivision would 
be connected to the City's mainline. A test was performed by the City Engineer and the 
Director of Public Works and Beckstead was informed by Mr. Wilburn that fire flow 
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pressure standards were adequate and sufficient water flow existed to service the 
proposed subdivision. (R. Vol. 1, Aff. of Scott Beckstead, pp. 101-102) The City 
engineer, Daryl Wilburn, confirmed in his letter of April 8, 2003, to the Department of 
Environmental Quality, that the location had passed a fire flow test by the Fire Marshall, 
and that there would be adequate fire flow during a peak day. (R. Vol. 1 p. 109) The 
City now states that it subsequently learned the fire flow would not be sufficient and that 
the Fire Marshall determined that although a six-inch line existed at the location of the 
subdivision, it connected to a four-inch line along Oneida Street and the City decided 
after consulting with the Fire Marshall to then require Beckstead to replace the four-inch 
line. (R. vol. 2, "2nd Aff. of Wilburn", P. 233) In the City's Brief at page 13, it states, 
"Without replacing the four-inch line with the six-inch line, Beckstead's subdivision could 
not be approved. He chose to replace the four-inch line in order to obtain adequate fire 
flow for his subdivision". Beckstead did not replace the four-inch line. The pipeline 
Beckstead installed is located along 800 East in Preston and the four-inch line along 
Oneida Street remains in place to this day. The pipeline Beckstead put in place 
connected a gap in the City's "loop" of its water system. Through a piece of tortured 
reasoning, the City now says it did not benefit from the installation of this pipeline, but it 
was only done at the behest of the Fire Marshall. Obviously, the Fire Marshall did not 
benefit from this improvement to the City's infrastructure, nor did the Fire Marshall 
collect any fees for connections to the pipeline installed by Beckstead. The City admits 
in its own Brief (P.3) that the City intended to at some date to complete its "ten-inch 
waterloop project". In other words, Beckstead directly benefitted the City by helping it 
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complete its "loop" project of the City water system by installing 1700 feet of mainline 
pipe. 
In September and October, 2004, the City collected, by its own admission, at 
least five connection fees from intervening property owners who have connected to the 
pipeline installed by Beckstead. (City's Brief, P. 4) The receipt of these fees by the City 
from property owners who connected to a pipeline where no pipeline previously existed, 
amounts to nothing short of a windfall to the City. It should be noted the pipeline is 
located approximately one-quarter mile from Beckstead's subdivision and has no direct 
connection to his subdivision (R. Vol. 1 "Aff. of Scott Beckstead", P. 103). 
The City claims it received no monies above its costs for the connections made 
to the pipeline installed by Beckstead, but what would have been its costs had 
Beckstead not installed the pipeline? To say that the City has not benefitted from 
having 1700 feet of new pipe installed without paying for it and that it has received no 
benefit from the connection fees made by property owners to the City with those 
monies being placed in the City coffers is a concept difficult to comprehend. 
In Beckstead's first Brief, he cited to the Court a case directly on point, Stephens 
0 
V. City of Notus, 101 Idaho 101, 609 P.2d 168 (1980). In a similar factual situation, a 
private developer was awarded the expenses he incurred when he installed water and 
sewer systems at his own cost and the City benefitted from his actions. Under a theory 
of unjust enrichment, the Court did not require a written contract to determine the City 
should be required to reimburse the developer for his costs for installing the water and 
sewer systems. The City has cited no case in opposition to the Stephens case, nor has 
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it attempted to distinguish it. The Stephens case still stands unchallenged as the law of 
the case in ldaho for the proposition a City may not require a developer to install a 
separate mainline water system and make improvements to the City's infrastructure 
without being required to reimburse the developer for such costs. 
Ill. THE NOTICE REQUIREMENT OF THE IDAHO TORT CLAIMS ACT MUST BE 
INTERPRETED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE CITY ORDINANCE. 
The ruling of the District Court would force the square peg of the notice 
requirement of the ldaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA) into the round hole of the City 
Ordinance. The District Court and the City argue prior appellate decisions mandate 
once a construction project is completed the notice requirement of ldaho Code f j  6-906 
is triggered and the clock begins ticking. Such a ruling simply does not fit within the 
context of the City Ordinance which allows for costs to be reimbursed over a period of 
five years whenever "benefitted intervening property owners" connect to the water or 
sewer system. The City would have the subdivider file a claim even though nothing is 
owed under the Ordinance until a new water connection is made to the pipeline 
installed by the subdivider. Under the Ordinance, a full five years could transpire 
without any intervening property owners connecting to the water system, consequently, 
nothing would be owed to the subdivider. It does not take a great deal of imaginative 
thought to determine how the City would have responded to a claim filed immediately 
after the Beckstead project was completed and no water connections had been made 
to the system. In essence, the "project", similar to a construction contract, would not be 
complete under the City Ordinance until all water connections were in place and the 
entire five years had elapsed. Farber v. Stafe of ldaho, 102 ldaho 398, 630 P.2d 685 
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(1981). The reasoning in Farberwas followed in a more recent case C&G, Inc. v. 
Canyon Highway District No. 4, 139 ldaho 140, 75 P.3d 194 (2003) indicating 
applicable since our courts have adopted the "project completion" rule in ldaho. For 
purposes of the ITCA's notice requirements, notice would not need to be given, "...Until 
the State completed all the acts pursuant to the contract it made for construction, the 
parties could not assess the extent of damages." The Court went on to say, 
"Furthermore, the Farber Court reasoned that if the party can present the government 
with a complete claim, the government might better attempt a settlement on the basis of 
clearly ascertainable facts." (C&G, lnc., supra at 144, 198) Not until all of the 
connections had been made to the pipeline within the 5 year period could the 
"damages", if any, be ascertained. The City's unreasonable interpretation of the notice 
requirement under the ITCA, if followed, would make a mockery of common sense. A 
claim would have to be filed when no right to compensation yet existed and no 
damages could be ascertained. The City would be forced to uniformly deny legitimate 
claims because nothing was owed at the time the notice was filed. 
The City argues Mitchell v. Bingham Memorial Hospital, 130 ldaho 420, 423, 
942. P.2d 544, 547 (1 997) is on point and should be applied to require Beckstead to file 
his claim with the City immediately upon completion of the project. The Nlitchell case 
involved a malpractice suit in which the determination of when the patient had sufficient 
knowledge to determine she had suffered an injury was at issue for the purpose of 
notice under the ITCA. The Court held the patient was aware of her overdose and 
respiratory arrest on the day the overdose occurred. She argued she did not know the 
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full extent of her damages at that time and therefore the notice period should not have 
commenced running. The Court stated in Mitchell: 
This Court has held that '[klnowledge of facts which would put a 
reasonably prudent person on inquiry is the equivalent to knowledge 
of the wrongful act and will start the running [I80 days] period'. 
McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741, 744, 
(1987). The Court has further held that the statutory period begins to 
run from the occurrence of the wrongful act even if the full extent of 
damages is not known at that time. 
Beckstead had no knowledge of any facts which would have put him on notice 
that the City was not going to reimburse him when future connections would be made to 
the pipeline he installed. The first time Beckstead knew the City was not going to follow 
the City Ordinance is when he received the letter dated November 16, 2004 from the 
City Attorney denying his right to reimbursement. (R.Vol. 1, "Aff. of Beckstead", pp. 
At the time Beckstead completed the project, there were no damages or 
compensation to be sought from the City under the City Ordinance. No water 
connections had yet been made. The "wrongful act" occurred when the City denied his 
right to reimbursement for the water connections in November 2004. Unlike "Mitchell" 
who immediately knew she had been injured due to an overdose of drugs at the 
hospital, Beckstead had no knowledge the City would refuse to reimburse him and his 
clam did not become "ripe" for purposes of the notice statute until his claim was denied. 
The City argues the case of Magnuson Properties Partnership v. Cify of Coeur d' 
Alene, 138 ldaho 166, 59 P.3d 971 (2002), stands for the proposition that Beckstead's 
claim was not timely filed. Beckstead submits this case has the opposite effect. In 
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Magnuson, at 170, the Court noted that Magnuson received a letter from the City of 
Coeur d' Alene denying his application for reimbursement on August 15, 1996. The 
denial letter then became the focal point for the commencing of the notice requirement 
to begin to run. The Court stated: 
As of August 15,1996, a reasonable and prudent person would have 
knowledge of facts of a wrongful act, i.e., the Cify's denial of andlor 
breach of the alleged contract. Therefore, the 180-day notice period 
began on August 15, 1996, and Magnuson failed to provide timely 
notice of its claim. 
Magnuson did not file his claim until February 18, 1997, more than 180 days after the 
City's denial letter. Beckstead, on the other hand, filed his claim with the City in 
October, 2004, even before receiving the City's letter of denial. It should be noted the 
Magnuson Court also stated that a previous letter sent by Magnuson asking for 
reimbursement dated May 10, 1996 was "arguably" a notice of claim for purposes of the 
ITCA. Magnuson failed to raise this argument at the District Court level and, therefore, 
it could not be raised on appeal for the first time. Beckstead has made no such error 
and has submitted his October 22, 2004 letter as a notice of claim throughout all 
proceedings before the District Court. 
To require Beckstead to file a notice of his claim when he completed installing 
the pipeline defies both reason and logic. At that point in time, there was no damage, 
right of reimbursement, compensation or anything like unto it owed by the City to 
Beckstead. He did not have a claim at that point in time. His claim arose when 
connections were made to the pipeline and the City denied his right to reimbursement. 
When the City allowed connections to the pipeline and began collecting fees from 
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intervening property owners without reimbursing Beckstead, the notice period began to 
run for both his claim under the Ordinance and for unjust enrichment. 
IV. BECKSTEAD'S LETTER OF OCTOBER 22,2004 WAS ADEQUATE TO GIVE 
THE CITY NOTICE OF HIS CLAIM. 
In its Memorandum Decision, the District Court found the letter from Beckstead 
to the City dated October 22, 2004, was adequate as a claim putting the City on notice. 
The District Court also noted the City Attorney's subsequent letter denying Beckstead's 
request for reimbursement to be an indication the City understood the letter to be a 
claim. The lower court took issue with the timeliness of the claim, not the adequacy of 
the notice. The City now takes exception on appeal to the adequacy of the notice, an 
issue not raised in the City's Cross-Appeal. (R. Vol. 2P. 278, pp. 336-337). 
In October of 2004, approximately one year after installing the pipeline, 
Beckstead learned of connections that had been made to the pipeline he had put in 
place. By letter dated October 22, 2004, directed to the City of Preston, he made a 
claim for reimbursement for the "off-site" improvements he had made to the City's water 
system, (R. Vol. 1, Aff. of Scott Beckstead, pp. 105, 119) he asked for the opportunity 
to meet with the City to discuss the process of reimbursement. Instead of being 
allowed to meet with the City, the City responded by a letter dated November 16, 2004 
from the City Attorney setting forth in considerable detail that his claim was denied. 
The City now argues Beckstead should have included additional information in the 
claim or that he should have amended his claim to add more specific details, despite 
the fact it had already been denied. The City did not state in its letter of denial it did not 
have sufficient information to determine what the claim was, its amount or any of the 
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other objections now raised by the City. Obviously, the City did not need additional 
information to deny the claim and the providing of additional information would have 
been a useless gesture. 
The City also argues a second Notice of Claim dated July 31, 2006, filed by 
Beckstead's counsel, is somehow proof that Beckstead himself did not believe his first 
letter to be a legitimate claim. Nothing could be further from the truth. Beckstead 
learned of additional connections being made to the pipeline he installed in 2006 by 
observing that actual physical connections were being made at that time. In an 
abundance of caution, the second Notice of Claim was filed in order to avoid an 
argument that no notice of claim had been made for additional connections to the 
pipeline he installed. The second Notice of Claim even references the first claim filed 
by Mr. Beckstead on October 22, 2004. (R. Vol. 1, "Beckstead Aff.", pp. 105, 129) 
In the case relied on most by the City, Magnuson Properties, supra at 170-171, 
975-976, the City ignores that part of ruling in Magnuson in which the first letter sent to 
the City should have been considered Magnuson's notice of claim under the ITCA. The 
reason it was rejected was because this argument was raised for the first time on 
appeal. Had Magnuson correctly argued his position, his letter would have been 
adequate to provide notice of a claim for purposes of the ITCA. The City also fails to 
recognize the importance the denial letter played in the Magnuson decision. The Court 
recognized the effect of the denial letter was to acknowledge a claim had been made. 
Despite having written a detailed letter denying Beckstead's claim in November, 
2004, the City still clings to its argument the Beckstead letter was deficient and it was 
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misled to its prejudice. This argument fails because the contents of the denial letter 
demonstrate a complete awareness of Beckstead's claim. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 121-122). A 
similar issue was decided, ironically, in another case involving the City of Preston. In 
Smith v. Cify of Preston, 99 ldaho 61 8, 621-622, 586 P.2d 1062, 1065-1 066 (1 978) the 
ldaho Supreme Court reversed the District Court's dismissal of a tort claim on the basis 
the notice was defective. In this case, a letter was sent to an insurance company 
claiming reimbursement of subrogation following an automobile accident in which Mr. 
Smith was involved. Although the letter did not meet all of the particular requirements 
of ldaho Code §6-907 as a statement of his claim, the City's insurance carrier replied to 
the letter indicating that it was denying Smith's request. Based upon that denial, the 
Court said: 
Although the contents of the letter of October 8 does not comply with 
all of the requirements enumerated in 96-907, we believe the 
contents of the letter were adequate in light of the final proviso of 
that section which states, "(a) Claim ... shall not be held invalid or 
insufficient by reason of an inaccuracy in stating the time, place, 
nature or cause of the claim, or otherwise, unless it is shown that the 
governmental entity was in fact misled to its injury thereby". 
How can the City claim to be misled by Beckstead's letter of October 22, 2004? 
The City's own letter of denial made it perfectly clear the City understood exactly what 
Beckstead wanted and the nature of his claim. Even though a specific amount was not 
stated, he was not allowed to elaborate further by meeting with the City, since the City 
denied the claim in its entirety without ever allowing him to present any further 
information. The City would be hard pressed to state with complete honestly it did not 
know that the Beckstead letter of October 22,2004 represented a claim, or that 
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somehow it was misled to its prejudice by that letter. Clearly, the City understood the 
contents of the letter or it would not have been able to prepare a detailed reply. 
The City cites several cases in which claims have been dismissed for failure to 
file a timely or proper notice of claim in its Brief. Each of these cases should be 
reviewed in light of its peculiar and separate set of circumstances to determine if they 
apply to the case at bar. 
The first case cited by the City in support of its argument is Foster v. Kootenai 
Medical Center, 143 ldaho 425,430, 146, P.3d 691, 696 (2006) in which the ldaho 
Supreme Court rejected the claim by Foster, but the factual circumstances are not 
similar to the case presented by Beckstead. In Foster, the Medical Center was 
forwarded a copy of a letter sent to the ldaho State Board of Medicine as part of a pre- 
litigation screening and no letter was sent directly to the Medical Center by the claimant 
indicating he was making a claim. The Court held: 
The Act's purpose of putting the government on notice of possible 
claims to which it may be subject, requires more than reliance on 
coincidental actions by a neutral third party. We conclude that 
Foster may not take advantage of ICBM's fortuitous decision to 
forward his letter to KMC to satisfy his obligation under $6-906 of the 
Act; he was required to formally notify KMC and his neglecting him 
to do so prevents adjudication of his tort claim. 
The October 22, 2004 letter from Beckstead was not sent through any third party 
to the City, but was sent directly to the City and the City understood its meaning. The 
Foster case does not apply either factually or through its holding to the circumstances 
of the Beckstead claim. The City further argues that under Fosterthe claim is deficient 
because no specific amount of damages was set forth in the Beckstead letter. 
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Beckstead offered to meet with the City to give the City particulars regarding his claim, 
however, the City refused to meet with him and instead sent him a very specific letter 
denying the very basis of his claim in any amount. The City had no doubts or confusion 
with regards to what he was claiming in his letter. When counsel filed a second claim 
for Beckstead, he was not recognizing the "inadequacy" of the first claim (City's Brief, 
P.24) but was filing to cover any additional water connections that Beckstead had 
learned of and wanted to make sure they were not left out. (R. Vol 1 "Aff. of 
Beckstead" p. 105). 
The next case cited by the City is BHA Invesfmenfs, Inc. v. City of Boise, 141 
ldaho 168, 108 P.3d 315 (2004). In BHA Invesfmenfs, at 174, the Supreme Court held 
a notice of claim filed by one entity would not be sufficient as a notice of claim for 
another and upheld the District Court's decision. The relevance of this decision to the 
facts before the Court regarding the Beckstead claim is obscure. There was no issue 
raised at any time before the District Court that the City did not know who was filing the 
claim. The Beckstead letter of October 22,2004 bears the letterhead of Scott 
Beckstead Real Estate Company and is signed by Scott Beckstead. (R. Vol 1, p.119) 
No other person nor entity was involved in this claim. When the City replied to the 
Beckstead letter, it had no confusion about who was making the claim and to whom its 
denial should be addressed. 
In the next case cited by the City in its Brief, Mitchell v. Bingham Memorial 
Hospifal, 130 ldaho 420, 942 P.2d 544 (1997), the Court held that oral statements 
made by the Claimant's attorney to representatives of the hospital were insufficient to 
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constitute a valid claim under ldaho Code $6-907. Beckstead has no argument with 
this holding since his letter of October 22, 2004 was in writing and did give notice of his 
claim which is defined by ldaho Code$6-902(7) as "...any written demand to recover 
money damages from a governmental entity or its employee which any person is legally 
entitled to recover under this act as compensation for the negiigent or otherwise 
wrongful act or omission of a governmental entity...". 
The City cites McQuillen v. Cify of Ammon, 11 3 ldaho 71 9, 747 P.2d 741 (1 987), 
a case in which a property owner had obtained a building permit which was later 
revoked by the City of Ammon. McQuillen argued that substantial notice had been 
given of his claim by previous court pleadings filed within the tort claim notice period, 
however, the Supreme Court held those pleadings were insufficient as notice of claim. 
The City cannot claim it did not have all the information it needed to determine what 
Beckstead wanted through his letter. Again, the denial letter dated November 16, 2004 
demonstrates the City knew exactly what Beckstead was seeking and there was no 
confusion about if he was claiming reimbursement for the costs he had incurred 
installing the pipeline. The City now claims it did not have adequate notice of the 
amount of the claim but providing that information was denied to Beckstead since the 
City refused to meet with him and it would have been pointless to provide the 
information, since the City was denying the entire basis for the claim as stated in its 
letter. 
Under Thompson v. City of ldaho Falls, 126 ldaho 587, 887 P.2d 1094 (1994) 
the Court held a claimant had not sufficiently described the conduct and circumstances 
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which brought about her alleged injury. If it is the City's argument it did not have 
sufficient knowledge regarding the conduct and circumstances which brought about 
Beckstead's claim, then a reading of the City's denial letter of November 16, 2004 
(R.Vol. 1, P. 121-122) dispels any such notion and refutes completely that argument. In 
its detailed two-page, single-spaced letter, the City demonstrated its knowledge of 
exactly what the circumstances and basis was for Beckstead's claim and to assert 
otherwise would be disingenuous. 
The last case cited by the City is Wickstrom v. North ldaho College, I1 1 ldaho 
450, 725 P.2d 155 (1986), a case in which students sued their college on the basis the 
college misrepresented they would qualify as entry-level journeymen after successful 
completion of their course work. The Court held their demand letter of August 21, 1984 
failed to serve as a d i c e  of claim since it did not state the names and addresses of the 
claimants, the amounts of claimed damages and the nature of the injury claim. There is 
no such confusion regarding the name and address of Beckstead and the nature of the 
injury claimed pursuant to his letter. The exact amount of his damages were not stated 
in the letter, but the City already had knowledge of the amount of the materials and 
costs he had put into the project, since the City had partially reimbursed him for the 
over-sizing of the pipe. Also, Beckstead did not know how many water connection fees 
had been made and so the exact amount of reimbursement available could only have 
been known by the City. He was never given a chan'ce to present further information to 
the City because the City already knew enough to deny his claim. In its denial letter, 
the City does not once indicate any confusion nor make any inquiry regarding the 
Reply Brief of Appellants/Cross Respondents - Page 21 
amount or details of the claim. It already had all of the information it needed to fulfil the 
notice requirement of the ITCA and to hold otherwise would be to exalt the form of the 
claim over its substance or intent. The form of the notice is not so important as whether 
the governmental entity knew that a claim was being made against it. Cox v. City of 
Sandpoint, 140 Idaho 127, 131, 90 P.3d 352, 356 (2003) The City cannot, in all 
honesty, state to this Court it did not know what the substance of the Beckstead claim 
was given its response to the claim. 
V. THE CITY WAS NOT MISLED TO ITS PREJUDICE BY THE FILING OF A 
CLAIM ON OCTOBER 22,2004. 
The City states it was somehow misled to its injury by the Beckstead letter since 
the City claims it was not aware Beckstead would seek reimbursement for his costs 
prior to the receipt of the letter on October 22, 2004. Yet, although there may be some 
disagreement as to the entire conversation, both Beckstead and the City engineer, 
Daryl Wilburn, recall a conversation in which Beckstead inquired about being 
reimbursed for the costs, materials and labor used to construct and install the water 
pipeline. Although there may be some dispute as to when the conversation took place, 
Mr. Beckstead indicating it took place while he was discussing the initial requirements 
for the subdivision and Mr. Wilburn indicating it took place later, after the pipeline had 
been installed, there is no dispute about the fact Beckstead inquired of the City 
Engineer about reimbursement for his costs. (R.Vol. 1, "Beckstead Affidavit" P.104; R. 
Vol2, "Wilburn Affidavit" P.234). 
By its own arguments, the City acts as if it had never heard of its own Ordinance , 
requiring reimbursement to a subdivider who has made off-site improvements to the 
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City's water system. The fact that the City does not like its Ordinance (it was 
subsequently repealed) did not make it ineffective or enforceable at the time the 
pipeline was installed. 
The City argues it could have charged more to intervening property owners who 
connected into the system had they only known of Beckstead's claim. However, the 
City points to no Ordinance which would allow it to charge more for a water connection 
under such circumstances. If this speculative argument is to be taken seriously, then 
the City would need a special ordinance granting it the authority to charge for one water 
connection differently from another solely on the basis the City had not installed the 
pipeline in the first place. The City Ordinance itself states: 
... The City shall thereafter enter a deferred credit in its books and 
records and shall charge the benefit of intervening property owners 
the fee rates for sewer and water connections in effect at the time 
such connections were made. (emphasis added) 
Under the Ordinance, the City could only charge those fees which were in 
existence at the time the connections were made. 
The City states that it makes little or no money from the installation of its water 
connections based upon the fees it charges. (See Affidavits of John Balls and Daryl 
Wilburn, R.Vol. 2, pp. 199-200, 201-202) It is doubtful what relevance this has to this 
case. Cities should not be in the business of making a profit from their citizens, 
however, the basis asserted for the costs of materials, labor, use of equipment, 
supervision and costs of administration, which are broken down in these affidavits, 
demonstrate that, except for the cost of materials, all of the other expenses would have 
been incurred anyway, whether the City workers were installing a water connection or 
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not. Hopefully, their labor and equipment would be involved in doing something else for 
the City as part of their regular duties. What is not answered by the City is how much 
more would the City be losing if it would have had to install the twelve-inch pipeline 
required of Beckstead. The City's argument is really immaterial since the Ordinance 
provides that the water connection fees paid "shall" be reimbursed and the subdivider 
"shall" be paid the costs of the installation of the facilities over a period of five years 
depending on how many connections are made to the water line installed. There is no 
mention of a net reimbursement to the City or anything similar to the argument now 
being made by the City. It simply cannot be found in the Ordinance 
VI. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DECLINED TO AWARD 
ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS TO THE CITY. 
Although the City inserted a standard or general request for attorneys fees in its 
answer to Plaintiff's complaint, no request for attorneys fees was made in the City's 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Since the issues was not raised by the City, Beckstead 
had no opportunity to respond to such a demand in their briefing to the Court. 
It is incumbent upon the City to ask for the relief it seeks in a Motion for 
Summary Judgment, including attorneys fees and costs if such are requested. The 
Court's own Memorandum Decision makes no mention of attorneys fees and costs 
being awarded to the City, since it was not an issue raised by the City in its Motion. To 
now demand an award of attorneys fees and costs without having made such a 
demand part of its Motion or in its briefing, places Beckstead at a disadvantage and 
would allow the City to come in through the back door instead of the front, unfairly 
raising the issue after having not requested it in the first place. Our appellate courts 
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have ruled ldaho Code §12-120(1) must be narrowly construed. Anderson v. Goodliffe, 
140 ldaho 446,449, 95 P.3d 64 (2004). Such narrow construction placed on the 
statute by our courts makes the necessity of requesting an award under this section 
imperative. 
In Garner v. Barschi, 139 ldaho 430,438, 80 P.3d 1031 (2003), the Supreme 
Court upheld a denial of an award of attorneys fees stating: 
A party claiming attorneys fees must assert the specific statute, rule 
or case authority for its claim. MDS Investments, LLC v. State, 138 
ldaho 456,465,65 P.3d 197,206 (2003). It is not sufficient to make a 
generalized request for attorneys fees. Crey v. FMC Corp., 135 ldaho 
175,181,16 P.3d 272, (2000). It is incumbent on the movincl parti' to 
assert the clrounds upon which it seeks an award of attornevs fees.. 
The District Judqe is not empowered to award fees on a basis not 
asserted bv the movincl parti'. Id. quoting Bingham v. Montane 
Resource Associates, 133 ldaho 420,424,987 P.2d 1-35,1039, (1999) 
(emphasis added) 
The City, as the moving party in this case, did not assert any grounds nor any 
requests for attorneys fees in its Motion. 
CONCLUSION 
The reading of City Ordinance §16.28.030 d~earl~demonstrates it intent to 
reimburse a subdivider for installing off-site improvements required by the City 
benefitting intervening property owners. On its face, the Ordinance directly applies to 
the facts and circumstances of thiscase. If a Court's first duty is to ascertain the intent 
of the drafters of the Ordinance from the plain language of the Ordinance, then no other 
interpretation is reasonable. Once the Court has ascertained and determined the intent 
of the Ordinance from its wording, then the application of the Ordinance to the off-site 
improvements made by Beckstead becomes obligatory. The City Ordinance does not 
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mandate verified engineering costs, competitive bidding, or payment to the City for the 
costs of the installation of the facilities since the Ordinance itself makes those actions 
discretionary through the use of the word "may". 
The purpose of the City Ordinance, its aim, object and design was to provide 
reimbursement to a subdivider upon whom the City imposed a requirement to make 
"off-site" improvements which would benefit the City or others, a task normally falling 
under the City's responsibility. It is not uncommon for cities, counties, utility companies 
or others to create such a rule or policy in order to promote development while at the 
same time sharing the burden for reimbursement of costs associated with extending 
pipelines, electric lines, to those who ultimately connect to such improvements. 
Beckstead has, according to the Ordinance, five years in which to seek 
reimbursement from the City for water connections made to the pipeline he installed. 
To require him to file a claim upon installing of the pipeline as the City argues, makes 
no sense as nothing was owed at that time. Such a rule would be unreasonable and 
purposeless. No water connections had been made at the time the project was 
completed and, in fact, none were made until October of 2004, at which time Beckstead 
sent his letter claiming reimbursement. 
To allow the City to escape responsibility under its own Ordinance for 
reimbursement to Beckstead in this case would amount to a windfall to the City which 
now has 1700 feet of new pipe added to is infrastructure. The City has collected water 
connection fees for which it has not reimbursed Beckstead, but has kept those fees 
which, in equity, it should not retain. 
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The notice provided to the City of Beckstead's claim by letter dated October 22, 
2004, was more than adequate to provide the City enough information to prepare a 
detailed response. There was no confusion, no inquiry and no meeting allowed with the 
City to provide additional information regarding the claim, since the City already knew 
Beckstead was asking for reimbursement for the costs he had incurred. After receiving 
the letter of denial, there would have been no point in providing additional information to 
the City, since they denied the very basis of Beckstead's claim. 
It is respectfully requested that the City be required to follow its own Ordinance 
and provide reimbursement to Beckstead and to not allow the City to be unjustly 
enriched by forcing Beckstead to install a pipeline for the benefit of the City and 
allowing the City to collect connection fees to a pipeline not paid for by the City. 
d 
DATED t h i s a s  day of May, 2008. 
Attorney for Beckstead 
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